Ambassador Li Song’s Keynote Remarks and Remarks Exercising the right of reply on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, November 2026

2026-11-20 04:39

Keynote Remarks under Agenda Item 5

“Transfer of the Nuclear Materials in the Context of AUKUS

and Its Safeguards in All Aspects under the NPT”

 

Five years ago, at the November Board of Governors meeting, the Chinese delegation first requested the inclusion of “Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT” in the agenda of the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference. Over the past five years, acting with a high sense of responsibility toward the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system, China has consistently advocated and promoted rational, serious, professional, and inclusive intergovernmental discussions among IAEA member states on the aforementioned issues.

Member States can get a full picture of the intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue, as well as the research and exchanges conducted at the expert level, from the records of all IAEA Board of Governors meetings and General Conferences over the past five years, and the rich collection of materials totaling 150 pages Chair’s summaries circulated as INFCIRC documents after the thematic workshops hosted by the Permanent Mission of China at the Vienna International Centre for four consecutive years (see INFCIRC/1091, 1213, 1293, and 1372 for details).

Here, I would like to focus on the following five contentious issues to further elaborate on China's views and propositions.

First, regarding politicization. The AUKUS partners always accuse China of advocating intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue out of political motives, and they arbitrarily boycott these discussions under the pretext of opposing politicization. What I want to emphasize is that in recent years, the tendency toward politicization within the IAEA has indeed become increasingly serious. This is prominently manifested in arbitrarily boycotting democratic discussions among Member States, refusing to allow or listen to dissenting views from other countries, and engaging in bloc confrontation and forcing countries to take sides. China firmly opposes such practices and rejects the groundless accusations from the relevant countries.

The overarching politics of the IAEA lies in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while preventing nuclear proliferation. Every issue on the IAEA agenda is underpinned by distinct political factors and cannot be detached from international political realities. What is crucial is that IAEA Member States should stand united on the side of upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, rather than creating division. The IAEA should be a forum for reason, not a venue for quarrels. Confrontation leads to no agreement, and voting produces no consensus. Upholding the overarching premise of solidarity, Member States should be able to adopt an attitude of equality and mutual respect, and earnestly listen to and fully discuss differing views and propositions, instead of “a chicken talking to a duck” or “playing the piano to a bull”—simply talking past each other.

Second, whether AUKUS can be regarded as a “routine safeguards project”. AUKUS is fundamentally different from the thousands of peaceful uses of nuclear energy projects carried out by IAEA Member States, and the relevant safeguards are by no means the same thing as those for indigenous nuclear-powered submarine programs developed by other countries. As I have stated many times, this is like the difference between a tiger and a cat, or between apples and oranges.

AUKUS represents the first time that two nuclear-weapon states and one non-nuclear-weapon military ally have engaged in nuclear submarine cooperation, involving the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. Such nuclear cooperation of strategic military significance sets a major precedent within the NPT and IAEA frameworks and has already generated spillover effects, fueling a growing trend of nuclear submarine proliferation among military allies. All of these pose undeniable, unconcealable, and unignorable real-world challenges to the NPT and the IAEA.

Third, on whether the NPT explicitly prohibits nuclear cooperation such as AUKUS, as well as the issue of invoking Article 14 of the model CSA. China believes that AUKUS is military nuclear cooperation conducted between nuclear-weapon states and a non-nuclear-weapon military ally for geostrategic security purposes. This represents an unprecedented breakthrough since the NPT entered into force more than half a century ago, and is undoubtedly a textbook case of nuclear proliferation.

The AUKUS partners claim that the NPT does not prohibit the transfer of enriched uranium at any enrichment level, provided that the transfer complies with relevant safeguards obligations. In fact, the NPT explicitly stipulates that each State Party undertakes not to provide nuclear material to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes unless the nuclear material shall be subject to safeguards. Since the NPT entered into force more than half a century ago, there has never been a case where a State Party transferred nuclear material to a non-nuclear-weapon state for non-peaceful purposes. Moreover, the transfer of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium involved in AUKUS is not in small quantities, but rather in massive quantities amounting to several tons. Such a transfer is unprecedented, and will also lead to endless trouble, if mishandled.

More than 50 years since the adoption of the model CSA, Article 14 has never been invoked by any State Party. How this famous “dormant clause” should be interpreted and applied today, 50 years later, and in particular whether it can be applied to cooperation such as AUKUS, is a question that IAEA Member States need to seriously consider. Even if Article 14 were to be invoked, AUKUS would involve how to conduct verification on nuclear-powered submarines, which the IAEA has never carried out before, as well as safeguards obligations that Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and the US and the UK, as nuclear-weapon states, have never previously undertaken. There is no precedent or template to follow on how the IAEA should address a challenge like AUKUS. The so-called “highest non-proliferation standard” cannot be dictated by the AUKUS partners, nor can it be decided behind closed doors between the AUKUS partners and the Secretariat. Other Member States must have not only the right to know, by merely being “kept informed”, but also the right to have a say in formulating the “highest non-proliferation standard”. This is our shared responsibility.

Fourth, on whether IAEA Member States can continue to further strengthen the comprehensive safeguards system on the basis of consensus. Looking back at the history of the IAEA, the improvement and development of the comprehensive safeguards system have always been carried out on the basis of universal participation, joint promotion, and consensus among Member States. AUKUS involves the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear material for military purposes, represents a historic breakthrough in the application of Article 14, and constitutes a historic breach of the boundaries of the IAEA safeguards practices and models. Its impact is by no means confined to AUKUS itself, but bears directly on the future of the safeguards system. Broad participation, inclusive discussions, and consensus-based decision-making among IAEA Member States are vital for ensuring that the comprehensive safeguards system continues to command the recognition and support of the broadest possible membership in the course of its improvement and development, and for further strengthening the authority and universality of the system.

Fifth, on how to view the role of the IAEA Secretariat. China believes that the mandate of the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat stems not only from the Statute, but even more fundamentally from the authorization of the Member States. For the Secretariat to play a professional, technical, and independent role on safeguards issues, it must be predicated on important consensus, joint authorization, and shared support achieved by all Member States through consensus. It is necessary for the IAEA Board of Governors and all Member States to conduct extensive, in-depth, and inclusive intergovernmental discussions on the new issues, new situations, new challenges, and new cases emerging in safeguards practices, including AUKUS, with a view to reaching a consensus-based outcome. This constitutes the most positive and strongest support for the Director General and the Secretariat.

The IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards held last week specifically included a plenary session on naval nuclear propulsion and IAEA safeguards, where experts from various countries engaged in in-depth discussions on relevant legal, procedural, and technical issues, with differing views emerging on several key issues of principle. Such open, transparent, and professional discussions are highly necessary. Participants recognized that significant challenges remain with respect to the tools, procedures and information needed to implement safeguards on nuclear-powered submarines.

We hope that the Secretariat will fully recognize the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, earnestly listen to the differing views of Member States, objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions, particularly where differences among parties lie, and assist the intergovernmental discussions with a scientific and professional attitude.

Me and my team stand ready to continue engaging in responsible and professional communication and cooperation with all Member States, including the three AUKUS countries, to jointly contribute to upholding and strengthening the IAEA system.

 

 

Remarks Exercising the Right of Reply under Agenda Item 5: “Transfer of the Nuclear Materials in the Context of AUKUS and Its Safeguards in All Aspects under the NPT”

 

China requests to exercise its right of reply to respond to the accusations made by AUKUS partners and the European Union that China’s inclusion of the AUKUS agenda item is politically motivated.

In my keynote remarks earlier in this session, I have already addressed this issue specifically. Regrettably, certain countries still persist in this politicized approach in their statements, following a familiar pattern typical of these countries: they act as if AUKUS is solely their own business, and other Member States have no right to question it or have a say in the matter.

In my keynote remarks, I raised a series of concerns from different angles, none of which touches upon any “classified information” regarding the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation itself. The questions and concerns raised by China bear on the common interests of all Member States of the IAEA. However, the countries concerned have never engaged in serious discussions with China or other Member States on these issues. This is precisely what I meant by “a chicken talking to a duck” or “playing the piano to a bull”. This is not how the Board of Governors should function. The IAEA Board of Governors should engage in serious, earnest, mature, and rational substantive discussions on major issues.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that proposing agenda items is a fundamental right of Member States. In the history of the IAEA, no Member State has ever prevented other Member States from proposing agenda items to the Board and putting them up for discussion in a confrontational manner. Rule 15 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors explicitly stipulates that supplementary items requested by a Member State shall be placed before the Director General’s report. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure have never prohibited setting separate agenda items on different aspects of the same matter. For instance, since March 2020, the Board had continuously considered the Iranian nuclear issue under two separate agenda items until the expiration and termination of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 in October 2025.

China calls on the countries concerned to stop arrogantly blocking discussions among Member States, and to fully respect the Rules of Procedure and the legitimate rights of Member States. Double standards find no support and will inevitably be rejected by all Member States.

 

 

Remarks Exercising the Right of Reply under Agenda Item 3(c): “Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia”

 

The Chinese delegation notes the Director General’s report and has listened carefully to the statements made by all parties. I request the floor to exercise the right of reply and elaborate on the following four points:

First, China does not agree with discussing the AUKUS issue under the agenda item titled “Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia.” This is our consistent position. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation involves not only how to conduct verification on nuclear submarines, but also the transfer of tons of weapons-grade uranium enriched to over 90% for military purposes. It also involves safeguards obligations that Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and the United States and the United Kingdom, as nuclear-weapon states, have never previously undertaken. The complexity of this issue cannot be encompassed under the title “Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia.”

Second, the report submitted by the Director General fails to address the concerns and questions raised by various parties regarding the transfer of relevant nuclear material and the safeguards and verification of the nuclear submarines. The report mentions that the issues discussed between the Secretariat and the AUKUS parties include verification methods of the quantity and composition of nuclear material subject to an Article 14 arrangement, and additional transparency measures while such nuclear material is subject to an Article 14 arrangement. What are these verification methods? Have they been verified through IAEA practice? What is the legal nature of the so-called additional transparency measures? Are they tailor-made by the IAEA Secretariat, or must they meet specific standards? What Member States truly need to know is not a general account of how many meetings the Secretariat held with the states concerned or what topics were discussed, but rather the Secretariat’s views and considerations on these specific technical and legal issues. A report that glosses over the substance in this way is not genuine transparency, and “confidential information” cannot serve as a mere pretext for dismissing Member States’ right to know.

Third, the intergovernmental process advocated by China is concerned not only with the AUKUS cooperation itself, but also with its long-term implications for the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

Can an NPT State Party transfer nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes? How should the IAEA conduct safeguards verification on nuclear submarines? These are major questions for which there is neither precedent to draw on nor model to follow. AUKUS is the first case to raise them, and it will set the precedent for how the IAEA handles similar issues in the future. This is precisely why China has consistently advocated handling the AUKUS issue in the most prudent, responsible and reliable manner, and why only through open, inclusive and transparent intergovernmental discussions can we hope to arrive at a solution that is credible, reliable, and broadly acceptable to all parties, and able to stand the test of time and practice.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to elaborate on our views regarding the wording of the agenda item “Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Republic of Korea.” The US-ROK nuclear submarine cooperation is the second nuclear submarine project conducted through cooperation between between a nuclear-weapon state and a non-nuclear-weapon state since AUKUS, and it also involves the transfer of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. “Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Republic of Korea” cannot capture the complex nature of this issue. The emergence of several new nuclear submarine cooperation projects in a short period will pose major challenges to international geopolitical security, the marine environment, and the safety of international waterways.

Given the non-peaceful nature of nuclear submarine cooperation and the proliferation risks it entails, and against the backdrop of its continued proliferation, the Board of Governors should treat and handle such issues with greater prudence. Sufficient communication should first take place at the level of the Board and Member States, so that a consensus can be reached. The Secretariat should take seriously and respond positively to the questions and concerns raised by Member States on all fronts, and assist the intergovernmental discussions in a scientific and professional manner.