This meeting marks the 24th consecutive time that the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference have taken up the AUKUS agenda item proposed by China since the announcement of the nuclear submarine cooperation among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,

Over the past five years, China has, from the perspective of safeguarding international and regional peace, security and stability and upholding the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system, actively promoted intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States on transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT

AUKUS is a strategic military nuclear cooperation between two nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear-weapon military ally. It is unprecedented in the history of the NPT and the IAEA, and has a fundamentally essential difference from the hundreds of peaceful nuclear cooperation projects carried out among IAEA Member States. Packaging AUKUS as a routine safeguards project is misleading the IAEA and fooling the international community.

Over the past half a century since the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) was adopted, Article 14 has never been invoked or applied by any State Party. It is well known that U.S. nuclear submarines are loaded with more than 200 kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) with a purity exceeding 90%, and AUKUS will form a fleet comprising eight nuclear submarines. Should Article 14 of the CSA be applied to AUKUS, it would mean that tons of weapons-grade HEU would be removed from IAEA physical inventory verification for decades, and the IAEA would lose continuity of knowledge with respect to such huge quantities of special fissionable material which should be under regulatory control.

The transfer of nuclear materials to a non‑nuclear‑weapon state for military purposes is without precedent in the history of the NPT and the IAEA. AUKUS partners claim that the NPT does not prohibit the transfer of nuclear materials at any enrichment level, which is not true. The NPT explicitly stipulates that all States Parties undertake not to provide nuclear materials to any non‑nuclear‑weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless such materials shall be subject to safeguards. The United States and the United Kingdom, as nuclear‑weapon states, not only intend to transfer tons of weapons‑grade nuclear materials to their non‑nuclear‑weapon military ally for military purposes, which is not peaceful, but also seek to invoke Article 14 of the CSA to exclude these materials from IAEA safeguards. Such a transfer clearly runs counter to the safeguards and non‑proliferation obligations that Australia, the UK and the US should bear.

AUKUS partners claim that AUKUS will uphold the highest non‑proliferation standards, will be subject to a robust set of verification measures, and that the IAEA will be able to continue to meet its technical objectives at all stages of the submarine's lifecycle. China welcomes these commitments. However it must be pointed out that, with respect to nuclear submarines, what constitutes the highest non‑proliferation standards, what constitutes robust verification measures, and what the IAEA's technical objectives are—none of these questions has been clearly answered to date. These are matters that should be decided by all Member States collectively; a small number of countries have no right to set rules for all States Parties. Regrettably, in the absence of a basic consensus on the above‑mentioned important issues, nuclear submarine cooperation among military allies has already shown a proliferation trend, This year, yet another country announced the launch of a nuclear-powered submarine cooperation program, and is going to start start consultations with the Secretariat on an Article 14 arrangement.

Looking back at the history of the IAEA, the improvement and development of the comprehensive safeguards system have always been carried out on the basis of broad participation, joint efforts, and consensus among Member States. AUKUS involves the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear material for military purposes and raises questions concerning the application of Article 14. It goes beyond the established boundaries of the IAEA’s safeguards practice and modalities, and its implications extend far beyond the arrangement itself. This is a matter that concerns the future of the safeguards system and the common interests of all Member States. All concerned parties have the right and the responsibility to participate in the discussion, express their views, and safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

The intergovernmental discussions promoted by China are aimed at addressing the various concerns arising from this issue within the IAEA framework. It should be for all IAEA Member States to seek a solution acceptable to all parties through an open, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable intergovernmental process. China respects and supports the Secretariat in carrying out its work in accordance with the mandate under the IAEA Statute. At the same time, China hopes that the Secretariat will fully recognize the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, fully respect and seriously listen to the different views of Member States, and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions, particularly the divergences among parties. We call on the Secretariat to take seriously and respond positively to the various questions and concerns raised by Member States, and to assist the intergovernmental discussions in a scientific and professional manner.

In actively promoting intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue, China has consistently advocated sovereign equality, respect for international law, multilateralism, and a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security approach. China believes that differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue and consultation, rather than conflict and confrontation.The Global Governance Initiative and the Global Security Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping fully reflect these principles. Upholding these principles serves the common interests of Member States and is essential to maintaining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Me and my team stand ready to continue responsible and professional communication and cooperation with all Member States, including the AUKUS partners, and to work together to contribute to upholding the IAEA and NPT regimes.