Chair,

This meeting marks the 23rd consecutive time that the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference have reviewed the AUKUS issue proposed by China since the Australia, UK, and U.S. announced their nuclear submarine cooperation. In the interest of safeguarding international and regional peace, security, and stability, and upholding the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT and IAEA safeguards system, China has been actively promoting intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States on different aspects of AUKUS.

During the recently concluded NPT Review Conference, states parties engaged in in-depth discussions on issues related to nuclear submarines, and we noted that many countries raised concerns and questions in this regard. On April 23, the Chinese Mission in Vienna hosted, for the fourth time, a workshop on non-proliferation issues at the VIC. The Workshop was attended by interested Member States, representatives of the IAEA Secretariat, as well as experts and scholars from think tanks and research institutions. Participants held substantive and in-depth discussions on various aspects of nuclear submarines, particularly the elements of a safeguards arrangement framework covering the full lifecycle of nuclear submarines, as well as the challenges posed by nuclear submarine cooperation among military allies to global geopolitics, the NPT regime, and nuclear security. The Chair’s summary of the workshop has been circulated as INFCIRC/ 1372 on the IAEA website, and we believe that this document will contribute to intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue within the IAEA framework.

AUKUS is essentially a bloc confrontation. It is a strategic military nuclear cooperation between two nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear-weapon military ally, unprecedented in the history of the NPT, and fundamentally different in nature from the hundreds and thousands of peaceful use projects conducted among IAEA Member States. If nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, driven by geopolitical purposes, extend their strategic military cooperation into the nuclear domain, beyond the boundaries that the NPT has maintained for half a century, would that not amount to crossing the threshold of nuclear proliferation?

The strategic military nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon military allies represented by AUKUS  has no precedent in the history of the NPT. It is like a stone thrown at the window of the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards system, and the "broken window effect" it triggers should serve as a serious warning to the international community. Last month, the Republic of Korea formally announced a new nuclear submarine cooperation program. Failure to promptly address the fallout from this strategic military nuclear cooperation could cause the entire building of the NPT and IAEA safeguards to collapse.

Throughout the IAEA's history, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards system have consistently been grounded in universal participation, joint efforts and consensual endorsement among Member States. The AUKUS cooperation involves the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear materials for military purposes, as well as the application of Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It goes beyond the boundaries of traditional IAEA safeguards practice and modalities, bears on the further development of the safeguards system, and concerns the common interests of all Member States. If a small number of countries seek to pressure the IAEA Secretariat into hastily formulating an arrangement for the application of Article 14 to nuclear powered submarines, sidestepping core issues, cutting corners, and bypassing the full participation and consensus of the Broad members, and further make use of such arrangement to endorse military nuclear cooperation among allies, this will have far-reaching and deeply negative consequences for the IAEA safeguards system and the NPT regime as a whole. No one can bear such a historic responsibility.

 The intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS proposed by China are aimed at addressing the broad concerns raised within the IAEA framework, spanning political, legal, technical, procedural, and normative dimensions. These concerns should be addressed collectively by all IAEA Member States through an open, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable intergovernmental process, with a view to seeking solutions acceptable to all parties. China respects and supports the Secretariat in carrying out its work in accordance with the mandate conferred by the IAEA Statute, and at the same time hopes that the Secretariat will fully recognize the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, take into account the diverse views of Member States, and objectively reflects the status of intergovernmental discussions, particularly the areas of divergence. We call upon the Secretariat to take seriously and respond constructively to the questions and concerns raised by Member States across all dimensions of AUKUS cooperation, and to facilitate intergovernmental discussions with a scientific and professional approach.

In actively promoting the intergovernmental discussion process on AUKUS, China has consistently advocated for sovereign equality, the international rule of law, and the practice of multilateralism. We uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, persist in addressing the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and maintain that differences between states should be resolved through dialogue and consultation rather than conflict and confrontation. These important concepts are fully embodied in the Global Governance Initiative and the Global Security Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping. Adhering to these principles serves the common interests of all Member States and meets the fundamental need to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

China stands ready to work with all parties to continue actively participating in and advancing the intergovernmental discussion process on all aspects of the AUKUS issue, and to jointly preserve the IAEA and NPT regime.