This meeting marks the 22nd consecutive time that the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference reviewed the AUKUS issue proposed by China since the U.S., UK, and Australia announced their nuclear submarine cooperation. from the perspective of safeguarding international and regional peace, security, and stability, and defending the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT and IAEA safeguards system, China has clearly denounced the nuclear proliferation nature of the AUKUS cooperation. We remain committed to promoting intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States on all aspects of AUKUS.
It is clear that AUKUS is by no means a conventional cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The AUKUS safeguards are fundamentally different from the hundreds of safeguards projects implemented since the establishment of the IAEA. It is well known that U.S. nuclear submarine reactors are fueled by over 200 kilograms of weapons-grade enriched uranium, with enrichment levels between 93% to 97%, with a designed lifespan of up to 33 years. Australia claims it will build a fleet of eight nuclear submarines. Should Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) be applied to this cooperation, it could result in tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) being exempted from IAEA physical inventory verification for decades. Consequently, the IAEA would lose the continuity of knowledge over a massive amount of nuclear material.
Throughout the IAEA's history, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards system have consistently been grounded in universal participation, joint efforts and consensual endorsement among Member States. AUKUS has broken the boundaries of traditional IAEA safeguards practices and models, which will surely bring the Agency's safeguards practice to new territories and uncharted waters, and setting important examples or precedents. This has implications for the future development of the safeguards mechanism and, consequently, for the common interests of all Member States.
The IAEA Secretariat is not in a position to provide a comprehensive, objective, scientific, and convincing answer on AUKUS safeguards based on existing practices and regulations. This issue must be addressed through a collective discussion involving all Member States via an open, transparent, inclusive, and sustainable intergovernmental process, with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
If a small number of countries seek to pressure the IAEA Secretariat into hastily formulating an arrangement for the application of Article 14 to nuclear powered submarines—by glossing over key issues and oversimplifying complex matters, and without the full participation and consensus of the Board—such an attempt to circumvent established procedures would inevitably deepen divisions among Member States and have far-reaching negative consequences for the IAEA safeguards system and the NPT regime. Who will bear such historical responsibility?!
Over the past four years of intergovernmental discussions, many Member States have raised various concerns from different perspectives. These include, for instance, how to ensure continuity of knowledge over the nuclear material involved in nuclear submarines, how to handle accidents occurring in military nuclear activities, and how the U.S. and the UK, as nuclear-weapon states, should undergo safeguards in the context of nuclear submarine cooperation. These complex political, legal, procedural, and technical issues cannot be resolved by a mere verbal commitment to the so-called 'the highest non-proliferation standards.' To selectively ignore these issues is just like covering one's ears while attempting to steal the bell.
Since last year, new changes have emerged in the situation, as more than one military ally of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region has shown a strong interest in developing nuclear submarines. This further illustrates that the challenges brought by the transfer of nuclear materials and its safeguards in the context of submarine cooperation between military allies are becoming more urgent. It also underscores the importance and necessity of continuously advancing the intergovernmental discussion process on AUKUS to safeguard the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.
China believes that the IAEA should uphold the principles of openness, transparency, and mutual respect. Guided by a sense of historical responsibility, the Agency should steadily advance an open, inclusive, transparent, and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process to appropriately address the new practices and challenges in safeguards posed by AUKUS. China respects and supports the Secretariat in carrying out its mandate in accordance with the IAEA Statute. At the same time, we hope the Secretariat fully acknowledges the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, gives due consideration to the diverse views of Member States, and objectively reflects the status of intergovernmental discussions, particularly the areas of divergence. We urge the Secretariat to carefully and actively respond to the questions and concerns raised by Member States in all respects, and to support the intergovernmental discussions with a scientific, professional, and impartial approach.
In actively promoting the intergovernmental discussion process on AUKUS, China has consistently advocated for sovereign equality, the international rule of law, and the practice of multilateralism. We uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, persist in addressing the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and maintain that differences between states should be resolved through dialogue and consultation rather than conflict and confrontation. These important concepts are fully embodied in the Global Governance Initiative and the Global Security Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping. Adhering to these principles serves the common interests of the broad membership and meets the fundamental need to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
We urge the U.S., the UK, and Australia to respond to the concerns of the international community with concrete actions, and to maintain transparent communication with other Member States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Me and My team stand ready to continue responsible and professional communication and cooperation with other Member States, including the three AUKUS countries.
【In response to the resistance from Australia, the U.S., the UK, and certain Western countries toward the intergovernmental discussion process advocated by China, Ambassador Li Song exercised his right of reply. He stated that:】
The Chinese delegation expresses its appreciation to all Member States that have engaged in rational, responsible, and earnest discussions under the AUKUS agenda item proposed by China. Meanwhile, I must respond to the groundless accusations made by Australia, the U.S., the UK, and certain Western countries against the intergovernmental discussions promoted by China, which are driven by their political motives. These countries have openly challenged the AUKUS agenda item that China has proposed for 22 consecutive times at the IAEA, as well as the right of IAEA Member States to set important items on the agenda of IAEA meetings. China expresses its strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to these actions.
More than four years since the AUKUS partners announced their nuclear submarine cooperation, this issue has remained a subject of immense controversy within the contexts of international and regional security, the NPT Review Process, and the IAEA framework. Maintaining a highly responsible attitude toward the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, China has called for the IAEA to have a dedicated agenda item to comprehensively discuss the multifaceted impact of AUKUS on the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards system. This requirement is both critically necessary and entirely legitimate.
Certain Western countries challenge the aforementioned efforts made by China and supported by other Member States, deliberately highlighting the IAEA’s technical professionalism while labeling China’s promotion of intergovernmental discussions as ‘politicization’, We must ask: the Secretariat and the Director General have been actively engaged in dialogue and cooperation with Iran; just last month, the Director General himself provided technical assistance for negotiations between Iran and the U.S. Can such technical assistance stop the war? Can it prevent its destruction of political and diplomatic processes? Can it offset the severe negative impact of the threat of force on resolving the Iranian nuclear issue within the IAEA framework? History—whether over the years, the past year, this year, or even just this past week has repeatedly proven that the so-called technical role of the IAEA is inevitably shaped by the broader international political and security environment. To unilaterally stress the ‘technical’ nature of AUKUS issue is nothing but an attempt to fool the IAEA Member States.
Chin’s promotion of intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS addresses the multifaceted concerns raised within the IAEA framework, spanning political, legal, technical, procedural, precedential, and traditional dimensions. We have consistently advocated for rational, objective, and responsible discussions, treating the diverse opinions of Member States with the utmost seriousness. Conversely, the interventions by the AUKUS partners and certain Western countries against agenda item proposed by China is all about one single objective: refusing to permit or listen to different views and opinions, and rejecting the intergovernmental discussions. This is a textbook example of double standards and an act of arbitrary hegemony. Since its establishment, the IAEA has upheld the tradition of respecting Member States' rights to propose agenda items and adopting meeting agendas through consensus. Should these Western countries flagrantly disregard such traditions and challenge the legitimate rights of Member States, it will severely undermine the Agency's work and cast a long, damaging shadow over its future operations, the safeguards system and its long-term development.
The Chinese delegation calls on IAEA Member States to jointly resist the aforementioned actions. China will continue to uphold a rational and responsible attitude, advocating that member states, based on mutual respect and with a professional approach, advance intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue, we will continue to contribute to this process.