Mr. Chair.

The Chinese delegation takes note of the DG’s report on AUKUS and listened attentively to the all the statements. I am requesting the right of reply to briefly make the following three points. 

First, China not in favor of discussing the AUKUS issue under the title "Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia." This is our consistent position.

Over the past three years, China has repeatedly stated our view on the nature of AUKUS in the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference as well as many other occasions. AUKUS is by no means a routine cooperation project on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is fundamentally different from the hundreds and thousands of peaceful nuclear projects conducted by Member States since the IAEA's establishment. Australia, the US, and the UK presented AUKUS as a peaceful nuclear cooperation project, which is just like covering one's ears while attempting to steal the bell. As is well known, AUKUS is a strategic military cooperation between two Nuclear-Weapon states and their non-Nuclear-Weapon military ally, which involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). From the perspective of its purpose, nature, and the activities involving the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material, this cooperation is unprecedented, crossing the threshold of nuclear proliferation, and falls outside the coverage of the IAEA's current safeguards regime. It is highly controversial and poses a severe challenge to the NPT and the IAEA.

For the above reasons, over the past three years, China has consistently raised the agenda item, which requests reviewing AUKUS from a non-proliferation perspective at each IAEA Board of Governors meeting and General Conference. The agenda item proposed by the Secretariat does not accurately reflect the nature and the significant controversies of the AUKUS submarine cooperation. China has made clear reservations on this matter, and we have expressed our position in the note to the Secretariat submitted prior to this meeting, thus we disassociate from this wording.

Second, the report submitted by the DG on AUKUS does not comprehensively and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States on AUKUS, nor the different views and concerns expressed by different parties. We express deep regret, concern, and dissatisfaction with this.

Over the past three years, particularly ever since March Board meeting of last year, under China's advocacy and the active participation of a wide range of Member States, intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS within the IAEA framework have continued been deepening. In addition to this effort, China held two workshops in VIC titled "Article 14: Challenges ahead" and "AUKUS: A Case Study about the Development of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards". More and more Member States attended the Workshop. Ambassador Ian Biggs was also invited to our workshop held in May this year.

During these intergovernmental discussion process, China, many other Member States, as well as the AUKUS partners expressed different arguments, views, positions, and concerns, which is natural and further underscores the complexity and controversy nature of the AUKUS issue. It has also enhanced the understanding of many Member States. However, why have these in-depth substantive discussions and views not been reflected in the DG's report? Why do AUKUS partners insist on pretending as if nothing has happened and insist on unilateral consultation with the Secretariat on the safeguard’s arrangement?

I wish to emphasize that the discussions and different opinions that have arisen in previous Board of Governors meetings and General Conference, have already, and will continue to, form an important part of IAEA Member States’ deliberations of AUKUS related nuclear proliferation and safeguards issues. They are consistently reflected in the records and the chair’s summaries of past meetings. Related written materials from China’s two AUKUS workshops were also circulated as INFCIRC/1091 and INFCIRC/1213. These are undeniable facts and ongoing history, which will become an important chapter in the history of the IAEA. We continue to call on the DG and the Secretariat to treat the intergovernmental discussions with an objective and impartial attitude. Only in such a way can the Secretariat demonstrate its independence and professionalism.

Third, there is significant divergence of opinion among Member States regarding the applicability of Article 14 of the CSA to the safeguards of AUKUS cooperation. Such divergence is inherent in the nature of AUKUS.

Article 14 of any CSA has never made any clear provisions for such cooperation as AUKUS. It must be pointed out that, as long as Australia along with the US and UK, continue to advance the AUKUS cooperation, the safeguards associated with this cooperation will remain to be the most controversial and challenging issue for the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards regime. Therefore, this is not an issue that can be resolved solely between the AUKUS partners and the Secretariat.

The AUKUS partners claim that safeguards arrangements between them and the Secretariat will set the “strongest precedent” and the “highest standard” for non-proliferation. But I ask, who gave you the right to set such “precedents” and "standards" for other Member States? The Secretariat said that it has the "technical capacity". But I ask, since the IAEA has never carried out safeguards on nuclear-powered submarines, nor has it ever engaged in related cooperation with nuclear-weapon states, where does the so-called "technical capacity" come from? Even if such safeguards were to be undertaken, should the "competence" be determined solely by the AUKUS partners?

I raise these questions as examples, without offering answers, nor is it my intent to indicate the direction of any solution. No one can provide an answer now, just as no one can predict the future of AUKUS. What I wish to highlight is that AUKUS is by no means a routine and peaceful safeguards issue, nor is it a matter that can be casually resolved. For such a complex issue, only through patient intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States, especially those interested and concerned, can we hope to develop a solid, credible, mature, reliable solution that is generally accepted by all Member States and will stand the test of time and practice. We hope that the DG and the Secretariat will play an independent, professional, and constructive supporting role in facilitating future intergovernmental discussions.

This is why China requests this Board session to continue to set a separate formal agenda item on the AUKUS issue, focusing on the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials involved in the AUKUS cooperation. I will further elaborate China's position under agenda item 7, and welcome IAEA Member States including AUKUS partners to participate in the discussion.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.