Mr. Chair,

At the November Board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) three years ago, the Chinese delegation proposed for the first time to include a stand-along agenda item on “Transfer of the Nuclear Materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT”. Today it is the 16th intergovernmental discussion on this item among the IAEA Member States.  At the United Nations General Assembly, NPT Review process, the IAEA and other multilateral forums, the discussion on AUKUS has been deepening with increasing number of Member States making comments, expressing concerns and proposing ideas. I also noted the changes in the attitude of the AUKUS partners. They are more proactive in having substantive dialogues with all parties, which merits welcome.

In the intergovernmental discussion process within the IAEA, there are divergent views and concerns between the AUKUS partners and other Member States with regard to the nature of AUKUS and the ways to address its safeguards. While on the other hand, all parties agree with the need to uphold the effectiveness of the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards system, adhering to the highest non-proliferation standard and preventing any negative impact from AUKUS to NPT and the IAEA. This is an important basis to review AUKUS related issues in the IAEA.

In view of the divergent views, particularly contentious concepts and principles, I would focus my intervention on the following aspects to contribute to our discussion today.

First, AUKUS is not a political issue deliberately raised by any Member State in the IAEA, rather it is a major issue of principle that the AUKUS partners and other Member States must face up to and resolve. The AUKUS partners has packaged the AUKUS cooperation into a routine and peaceful safeguards project and that false-proposition has been consistently misleading the Member States. AUKUS is not cooperation between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon state on peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is fundamentally different from the Brazil’s indigenous nuclear submarine  programme. AUKUS is a strategic nuclear cooperation between two nuclear weapon states and their non-nuclear weapon ally for military purposes which involve transfer of tons of weapons-grade HEU.

Whether such cooperation is nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation? How to interpret NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards provisions? Given serious divergence of opinions among member states on these questions, neither the AUKUS partners nor the Secretariat can turn a blind eye to them. AUKUS cooperation is unprecedented in the history of NPT and IAEA, and the IAEA has never implemented such safeguards arrangement. AUKUS safeguards involve many complex political, legal, procedural and technical issues, which cannot be addressed by simplification and there are no simple answers.

Second, the AUKUS safeguards issue is not only a matter between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat. For example, how the US and the UK accept safeguards? No one has answered this question. No matter whether it is Australia's or the US and UK's arrangements with the Secretariat, it will inevitably involve new territories and new developments in the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards practice. The AUKUS partners do not deny this. They want to formulate safeguards arrangements with the Secretariat, to constitute the "strongest precedent" and "highest standard" for non-proliferation. In other words, their aim is to have the Secretariat to give a green light to AUKUS and to set rules for other Member States. They also came up with  some specific principles to apply the rules for others.

I want to emphasize that the further development of the IAEA safeguards regime is related to the interests of all member states. The era when a few countries set rules for other countries should be long gone. Such practices will no longer be accepted by IAEA Member States, and will only lead to greater division and disputes, causing long-term harm to the NPT and IAEA.

Third, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards regime has always been led by Member States together with technical support provided by the Secretariat in accordance with the common wishes among Member States. Especially, widely participation of Member States and consensus-based decision-making are the most important traditions, which ensure that the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards regime keeps pace with the times, subject to general acceptance by all parties, and are also the fundamental guarantee of the authority, integrity, effectiveness, universality and future applicability of the IAEA safeguards regime. Defending this tradition should be regarded as the most important political principle of the IAEA. If this tradition is destroyed and leads to the division of Member States, it will inevitably have a far-reaching negative impact. No one can afford such a historical responsibility, and the AUKUS partners should think twice.

Fourth, in view of the long-term nature, the complexity, the contentiousness and uncertainty of the AUKUS cooperation, the most prudent, responsible and appropriate way of addressing the AUKUS issue in the IAEA is to further promote the intergovernmental discussion process. The intergovernmental discussion process that China has advocated is a process where the IAEA Member States conduct open, inclusive, democratic and transparent discussions on all aspects of AUKUS, in particular, issues concerning precedents, models, criteria and principles, on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

On the issue of AUKUS, there should be no “one-voice” approach and unilateralism, no bloc politics or coercion of parties to take sides. Countries that express different views should not be labelled as “politicizing”, least of all should there be attempts of concealing the moves or doing things under the table.  Only through meaningful and sustainable intergovernmental discussions will it be possible to find, step by step, a solution that will be broadly accepted by all Member States and that will stand the test of time and practice. Seeking common ground while shelfing differences, taking a long-term perspective, preserving unity and avoiding division— these should be the principles for all Member States.

Fifth, on the issue of AUKUS, the IAEA Member States should take the lead. The Director General and the Secretariat don’t have to take side, and they indeed should not do so. Precisely because we do value and respect the role of the Secretariat, it is our hope that the Secretariat will truly adhere to their technical attributions of objectivity, impartiality and independence, fully realize the complexity of the AUKUS cooperation, fully respect and seriously treat the different views of Member States and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions, particularly the differences and outstanding issues in their reports. We hope that the Director General and the Secretariat will play an independent, professional and constructive role to facilitate further intergovernmental discussions, strengthen communication with the Member States for future consensus.

I, together with my team, always stand ready to continue our responsible and professional dialogue and cooperation with the Member States as well as the AUKUS partners, the Director General and the Secretariat.  

Thank you, Mr. Chair.