Mr. Chair,

Ever since the US, UK and Australia announced the AUKUS submarine cooperation project three years ago, China has, at the United Nations General Assembly, in the NPT Review Process and at the IAEA and other multilateral fora, unequivocally made known its position and been actively advocating for and promoting intergovernmental discussion on this issue among Member States. The discussion on AUKUS today is the 15th intergovernmental discussion by IAEA Member States on the item proposed by China. Although the AUKUS partners have their own views on the agenda item, they also increasingly engaged in discussions within the framework of the NPT and IAEA.

Important progress has been made in the afore-mentioned intergovernmental discussions process. Member States have further enhanced their awareness and understanding of the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue. More delegations chose to participate in the discussion, expressing their own views, concerns, and proposals. It is evident that on the issue of AUKUS, the Member States have both important consensus and clear differences. On the one hand, Member States generally believe that we should firmly commit to preserving the authority, integrity and effectiveness of the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards system. The AUKUS cooperation should not have a negative impact on the NPT and the IAEA. This is also what the AUKUS partners have expressed. On the other hand, regarding the nature of AUKUS and how to properly address the various issues arising from AUKUS within the IAEA framework, the AUKUS partners and other Member States hold different opinions and positions. This is also precisely where the uniqueness, complexity, and sensitivity of the issue of AUKUS lie.

Mr. Chair,

With regard to the nature of AUKUS cooperation, China has consistently been outspoken and direct in its views. We believe this is outright nuclear proliferation which runs against the purpose and principles of the NPT. It is a strategic military cooperation between two Nuclear-Weapon states and their non-Nuclear-Weapon military ally, which involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) and breaks the traditional boundaries of IAEA safeguards. Such nuclear cooperation with strategic military significance is something unprecedented in the history of the NPT and IAEA. Neither the NPT nor the IAEA has made any explicit endorsement or regulations on such cooperation and there is no consensus among the Member States either.

The serious impact and profound challenges produced by AUKUS on the NPT and IAEA should not be ignored by anyone. If any country can, for geopolitical or so-called great-power competition purposes, to carry out nuclear cooperation like AUKUS or other similar strategic military nuclear cooperation, the NPT regime and the IAEA will become chaotic. The international community should seriously consider whether taking such a lead and setting such a precedent is beneficial or detrimental. Reality will provide the answer, and history will eventually draw a fair conclusion.

For the IAEA, AUKUS is by no means a routine cooperation project on peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is fundamentally different from the hundreds and thousands of peaceful nuclear projects conducted by Member States since the IAEA's establishment. The AUKUS safeguards will involve new practices as well as uncharted waters of the current IAEA safeguards and set significant model and precedent. How we are viewing and handling the AUKUS-related models and precedents will, again, involve a series of important principles and standards, affecting the current and future interests of countries relating to nuclear-powered submarines. Generally speaking, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards regime is closely related to the common interests of all Member States.

Mr. Chair,

Since last year, the Chinese Permanent Mission has hosted two workshops at the VIC, with discussions conducted focusing respectively on the application of Article 14 of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the development of the IAEA safeguards regime. We compiled the relevant discussions into two complete sets of materials, which were distributed to Member States in the form of INFIRC/1091 and INCIRC/1213. Four AUKUS-related side events were also held during the NPT review process. All the afore-mentioned discussions, as well as the intergovernmental discussions at the Board Sessions and General Conference of the IAEA, have attracted more and more participating countries and the discussions become more active.

In parallel, the AUKUS partners formally signed the AUKUS Cooperation Agreement, and their substantive exchanges and cooperation have been continuously increased. These developments raise more and increasingly complex legal, procedural, and technical issues, which are of great concern to IAEA Member States. In a nutshell, the AUKUS safeguards arrangement might be the most controversial, challenging and divisive issue ever since the establishment of the IAEA safeguards mechanism, involving multiple difficult issues of how will, not only Australia, but also the US and the UK, the two nuclear-weapon states, be subject to IAEA safeguards. 

It is important to point out that none of these issues is made up by other countries without reason. All of them are triggered by AUKUS itself. These issues cannot be brushed aside by one or two non-proliferation commitments from the AUKUS partners, nor should they be handled by Australia and the IAEA Secretariat alone. IAEA Member States have the right and responsibility to fully discuss all aspects of AUKUS with a view to gradually seek consensus.

In my conversation with an ambassador yesterday, he said that the only thing that could lead to the collapse of IAEA safeguards should be AUKUS. The words touched me deeply and provided two insights. First, more Member States have serious concerns and worries about the AUKUS issue. What many countries having in their mind is far deeper and more serious. Some of them might choose not to express them publicly for now. Second, although this statement may sound alarmist for someone, it does indeed reveal the essence of dealing with the AUKUS issue within the IAEA framework.

Mr. Chair, 

It has been 30 years since the end of the Cold War, and the era when a few countries manipulate international institutions and dominate global rules, imposing self-serving new regulations and standards on others for their own benefit and pragmatism, should be long gone!

The AUKUS issue must be dealt with through true multilateralism. and discussions must be conducted by IAEA Member States on the basis of equality and mutual respect, through an open, inclusive, democratic, transparent, meaningful, and sustainable intergovernmental process. There must be no "one-voice" approach, unilateralism or double standards on the AUKUS issue, no labeling of countries expressing differing opinions as "politicizing," and no bloc politics or coercion of parties to take sides.

This is not only an important embodiment of the "Vienna Spirit", but also a significant tradition that the IAEA safeguards regime has always followed in its development. If this tradition of inclusive discussion and consensual decision-making is abandoned and undermined, leading to division among IAEA Member States on the development of IAEA safeguards regime, it will inevitably leave a catastrophic impact on the authority, integrity, effectiveness, universality and future applicability of the comprehensive safeguards regime. No one can afford to bear such a historical responsibility. The AUKUS partners should think twice. 

I would like to reiterate that, the challenges AUKUS has brought to the NPT and IAEA, and the many complex issues triggered by AUKUS, are facts that cannot be ignored or obliterated. The discussions on AUKUS among IAEA Member States are a historical process that cannot be avoided or stopped. China calls on all Member States to work together to promote the intergovernmental discussion process on the AUKUS issue by adopting a highly responsible attitude towards the NPT and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime. Seeking common ground while reserving differences, taking a long-term approach, maintaining unity and avoiding division should be the principles followed in the intergovernmental discussion process.

We request the IAEA Secretariat to fully recognize the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, listen carefully to the different opinions from different Member States, objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions, in particular different views among Members States as well as pending issues, in future AUKUS reports, and facilitate the intergovernmental discussions in a scientific and professional manner, promote Member States to seek consensus with a gradually approach.

I, together with my team, am willing to continue communication and cooperation with other Member States, including with the AUKUS partners, in a responsible and professional manner.