（June 6, 2024, Vienna International Center）
Mr. Chair,
This marks the thirteenth consecutive time that the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the Agency review the AUKUS issue since its announcement by Australia, the UK, and the US. Over the past year, with the active participation of IAEA Member States, the discussions in the Agency on the AUKUS issue have been deepening. More and more Member States participated in the discussion and expressing diverse positions and concerns.
On May 10th, the Permanent Mission of China hosted another workshop on AUKUS at the VIC, open to all Member States of the Agency. Over 100 participants, including representatives from the Permanent Missions of nearly 50 countries, members of the Agency's Secretariat, and experts and scholars from academia attended. We were pleased to have Ambassador Ian Biggs, Permanent Representative of Australia, and Mr. Ionut Suseanu from the Agency's Secretariat, participate in the workshop and share their perspectives.
During the workshop, there were active discussions focusing on several key topics, namely, “IAEA safeguards tradition: typical and historical cases for the development of IAEA safeguards system, including arrangements related to the non-application or special procedures of safeguards” “AUKUS and its transfer of weapon-grade nuclear material: new practice, new territory and new development of IAEA safeguards” “Paragraph 14 and AUKUS: whether a universally applicable method is necessary/feasible? How to define non-discriminatory and universally applicable safeguards approaches, safeguards objectives, safeguards measures, and special procedures?” “Developing safeguards arrangement on AUKUS: role of the Secretariat, Board of Governors and Member States”. Experts and representatives expressed various positions, concerns, and ideas, raising numerous questions regarding AUKUS cooperation. As with last year's workshop, China has compiled the written presentations from all parties, which the Secretariat has circulated as INFCIRC/1213. We believe this document will help Member States understand the broader implications of the AUKUS issue, particularly those affecting the common interests of Member States beyond the AUKUS partners. It will also facilitate intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS within the IAEA framework.
Chair, Colleagues,
This year has seen new developments in AUKUS cooperation, and the international community is paying close attention to the impact of this new military alliance, which combines the nature of strategic equipment system cooperation and high-tech military research and development, on the Asia-Pacific region and international strategic security and stability. AUKUS presents an unprecedented challenge to the NPT regime and the IAEA comprehensive safeguard system. Australia, the US, and the UK claim that AUKUS-related safeguards are routine safeguard project between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, but this is not true. The AUKUS is a strategic military cooperation involving transfer of nuclear submarines with tons of weapon-grade HEU. Such cooperation is carried out between two Nuclear Weapon States and their non-Nuclear Weapon State military ally, driven by Cold War mentality and geopolitical agenda. This cooperation is clearly not a routine and peaceful safeguards project between IAEA non-nuclear-weapon Member States and the Secretariat. And it is fundamentally different from the indigenous development of nuclear-powered submarines by non-nuclear-weapon Member States.
Even at a technical level, AUKUS safeguards do not concern only one country, Australia. The nuclear reactors and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium necessary for developing nuclear submarines are provided by the US and the UK. Therefore, IAEA safeguards will inevitably cover the relevant equipment, facilities, and sensitive nuclear materials of these two nuclear-weapon States. The implementation of safeguards by the IAEA on facilities and items related to nuclear submarines in nuclear-weapon States is evidently a new territory, new practice, and a new subject.
Australia, the US and the UK claim that their communication with the IAEA Secretariat on the AUKUS safeguards issue involves sensitive classified military information and other countries are not allowed to ask about it. It is true that all countries are entitled to protect sensitive information concerning national security, and others indeed have no right to ask about it. However, the AUKUS-related safeguards project has broken the boundaries of traditional IAEA safeguards practices and models, which will surely bring the Agency’s safeguards practice to new territories and uncharted waters, and setting important examples or precedents. At stake is the further development of the safeguards mechanism, and hence the common interests of all Member States. Such issues should naturally involve wide participation and joint discussion among Member States to form a common understanding and establish precedents and new models of universal significance.
All of the above issues were touched upon in the workshop on May 10. Experts at that workshop also discussed the important history of the development and improvement of the IAEA safeguards mechanism. The inclusive discussions with wide participation of Member States, and reaching new understandings and models through consensus-based approaches, are two paramount traditions for the development and improvement of the safeguards mechanism. Such traditions ensures that the IAEA safeguards system keeps pace with the time, on the basis of general acceptance and support of Member States. Upholding this tradition is in the common interests of all Member States, including the AUKUS partners. Once this tradition is undermined, we are facing the risk of losing authorities and effectiveness of many aspects of the IAEA safeguards system.
Representative of the IAEA Secretariat shared some views on AUKUS during the Workshop in May. But my impression is that the Secretariat's opinions did not and could not fully explain and resolve all the sensitive and controversial issues relating to AUKUS safeguards, rather, they gave rise to new debates. I believe that everyone supports and hopes that the Secretariat will fully play its due role. At the same time, on complex and sensitive issues such as AUKUS, it is more than ever necessary for the Secretariat to listen carefully to the different views and concerns expressed by Member States and jointly respond to the AUKUS challenge through full communication and discussion with Member States.
Mr. Chair,
China believes that the IAEA Secretariat and all Member States should view the AUKUS issue from the perspective of international and regional security and stability, particularly considering the integrity, effectiveness, authority, and universality of the NPT and IAEA mechanisms. The intergovernmental discussion advocated and promoted actively by China, with the participation of the IAEA Member States, is not an exclusive "parallel mechanism", as misapprehended or misinterpreted by some countries; rather, it is an open and inclusive democratic mechanism accessible to all IAEA Member States. We welcome all Member States, including Australia, the US, and the UK, to share their views and duly respect the positions and propositions of others. AUKUS involves many non-proliferation, legal, and technical issues, as well as new areas and new practices of IAEA safeguards. Faced with such a complex issue, different Member States have different views, propositions, and demands based on their own understanding, interests, and concerns. This is a reality that all parties must face up to, and it also shows the necessity of keeping the intergovernmental discussion process.
The intergovernmental discussion process advocated by China has never been a political exercise of choosing sides. All parties ought to stand on the side of safeguarding the NPT and IAEA regime. Discussions around AUKUS should not become a "monologue" and all parties should participate responsibly in the discussion process with mutual respect and in a constructive manner, without imposing one’s own propositions on others. Let us uphold the principles of openness, transparency, mutual respect, and the "Vienna Spirit" , take a responsible attitude towards history, and steadfastly promote an open, inclusive, and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process so as to properly address the new practice and new challenge in the field of IAEA safeguards posed by AUKUS.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
【In response to the AUKUS partners’ statements, in which they resisted the intergovernmental discussion process advocated by China on the grounds that the IAEA Secretariat is fully capable of implementing safeguards on the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation and that other countries have no right to intervene, Ambassador Li Song exercised his right of reply multiple times to firmly refute these claims. He pointed out that:】
The IAEA should be a place for reasoning, not for fight. It is precisely with this belief that China advocates and promotes the intergovernmental discussion process on the AUKUS issue. Just now, some Member State representatives accused China’s actions of being 'politicization'. I must say, not allowing Member States to speak, being unable to accept differing opinions, rudely refusing member state discussions, forcing others to take sides, and using the majority seats in the IAEA Board to obstruct the intergovernmental discussion process, there are the epitome of politicization!
The AUKUS issue involves complex political, legal, and technical matters, which have been discussed in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There is widespread concern about the unprecedented impact AUKUS could have on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and on international and regional strategic security and stability. Isn't it normal to discuss AUKUS-related safeguards at the IAEA level, especially regarding new practices and models of IAEA safeguards and their development and improvement through intergovernmental discussions? Prohibiting such discussions is what constitutes politicization.
Regarding the role of the IAEA Secretariat, China, like other Member States, respects and supports the Secretariat in exercising its mandates as authorized by the Statute. However, safeguards of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is something the IAEA Secretariat has never done in its decades-long history. On what basis can the Secretariat claim it has the capability to do this? Now, certain Member States are not allowing other countries to speak, and the Secretariat is also not listening to other opinions. This is what is truly abnormal. We hope the Secretariat will seriously listen to Member States' opinions and engage with them to discuss the safeguards related to AUKUS. This is not about undermining the professional role and authority of the Secretariat, but about supporting the Secretariat in fulfilling its non-proliferation mandates through discussions with Member State, thereby ensuring it acts fairly, objectively, and effectively on relevant issues.
In previous discussions, some Member States have repeatedly raised the question, 'Who is the Agency?' Raising this question is not intended to undermine the Secretariat, but it is crucial to remember that the IAEA is an intergovernmental organization composed of and led by Member States, with the General Conference, the Board of Governors, the Secretariat, and the Director General each fulfilling their respective roles. Member States' requests to discuss an important issue like AUKUS, which concerns the integrity, effectiveness, and authority of the safeguards mechanism, should not be suppressed or resisted, nor should they be labeled as politicization. If the intentional resistance by a few countries to intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue leads to division within the Board of Governors and among Member States regarding the development and improvement of the IAEA safeguards mechanism, it would be a great tragedy.
Regarding the issue of the 'parallel process' mentioned by the Australian Permanent Representative, I would like to reiterate that the intergovernmental discussions promoted by China are exactly the discussions under the relevant agenda items of the Board of Governors and the General Conference. China engages in transparent actions, not conspiracies, and does not engage in any parallel process. Over the past two years, the 13 discussions by IAEA Member States on the AUKUS issue, including those discussions concerning the reports submitted by the Director General, are all part of the intergovernmental discussion process I mentioned. I also urge the AUKUS partners to continue participating in these discussions with the wider Member States in a rational, responsible, and professional manner. I sternly warn certain countries not to rudely resist the intergovernmental discussion process and not to create further politicization and political confrontation within the Board of Governors and among Member States.