Mr. President,

This marks the 20th consecutive time that the IAEA, at China’s proposal, review the AUKUS issue. 4 years ago, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom announced nuclear submarine cooperation for geopolitical purposes. This was the first time that two Nuclear-Weapon-States had engaged in nuclear submarine cooperation with a Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State military ally. It was also the first time that several tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials were transferred, crossing the threshold of nuclear proliferation and posing a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Over the past 4 years, from the perspective of safeguarding international and regional peace, security, and stability, and defending the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT and IAEA safeguards regime, China has clearly stated its position and propositions at multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly, the NPT review process and the IAEA, and has continuously promoted rational and responsible reflection and discussion of all aspects of the AUKUS issue by the international community.

Since 2023, the Permanent Mission of China hosted annual AUKUS workshop at the Vienna International Center for three consecutive years. This year, the workshop focused on the theme “AUKUS: New Challenges to the IAEA Safeguards”. The event brought together representatives from over 30 IAEA Member States, including Permanent Representatives of 17 countries, as well as officials from the IAEA Secretariat, experts and scholars from think tanks and research institutions worldwide. Participants engaged in in-depth exchanges and held open, professional, solid, and thorough discussions on various aspects of the safeguards on AUKUS. A summary of the discussions has been circulated as INFCIRC/1293 on the IAEA website. I believe this document of over 30 pages will be helpful for everyone to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the AUKUS issue.

Through these efforts, IAEA member states have gained a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the nature of the AUKUS issue and its significant impact on the development of the IAEA safeguards system. More countries joined in the discussion, expressing diverse views, concerns, and opinions. A significant and clear consensus has emerged: IAEA Member States must uphold the highest non-proliferation standards to prevent the negative impact of AUKUS on the NPT system and IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

Mr. President,

The AUKUS cooperation is essentially a bloc confrontation based on Cold War mentality, which runs counter to the purpose and objectives of the NPT. If such a precedent is set, the very foundations of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime will be shaken. This is a major issue of principle. IAEA Member States must view this issue from a political perspective, and the Secretariat should likewise. All parties should, with a high sense of responsibility for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, prudently address the challenges posed by the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation to the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards system.

AUKUS cooperation is fundamentally different from the hundreds or even thousands of peaceful nuclear cooperation projects carried out among IAEA Member States. the safeguards on AUKUS are neither routine safeguards for peaceful uses of nuclear energy nor safeguards applied to a Member State's own nuclear program. Attempting to dress up a tiger as a cat and or call an orange a tangerine is misleading IAEA Member States and deceiving the international community. Such rhetoric should be discontinued and will not be accepted.

AUKUS involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and raises numerous complex political, legal, procedural, and technical issues. It also involves safeguard obligations that Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and the United States and the United Kingdom, as nuclear-weapon states, have never previously undertaken. IAEA has never implemented safeguards on any nuclear submarine, let alone on safeguards on a nuclear submarine cooperation project between two Nuclear-Weapon-States and another Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State. If the IAEA were to implement safeguards on AUKUS cooperation, it will inevitably break the boundaries of the existing practices and models of the comprehensive safeguards regime, set an important precedent, and have far-reaching implications for other Member States.

Throughout the IAEA's history, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards regime has always relied on universal participation, joint efforts and consensual endorsement among Member States. how we are viewing and handling the AUKUS safeguards issue is related to the integrity, effectiveness and future applicability of the comprehensive safeguards system and is closely related to the common interests of all member states. On such an important issue，each Member State has the right to voice and responsibility to uphold the regime. No single state has the authority to dictate rules to the IAEA and other Member States, Australia, the US and the UK, are no exception.

Mr. President,

In actively promoting intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS, China has consistently advocated for sovereign equality, adherence to international rule of law, and the practice of multilateralism. It has stayed committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security., prioritized the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and insisted on resolving differences between countries through dialogue and consultation, rather than conflict and confrontation. These are the key concepts fully embodied in the Global Governance Initiative and Global Security Initiative put forward by President Xi Jinping. Adherence to these principles serves the common interests of all Member States and is fundamental to upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA must address the AUKUS issue in the most cautious, responsible, and prudent manner, with a focus on safeguarding the integrity, effectiveness, authority, and universality of the NPT and IAEA regimes. China calls on all IAEA Member States to oppose unilateralism, double standards, bloc confrontation and taking sides on the AUKUS issue. China advocates that Member States adhere to the principles of seeking common ground while shelving differences, taking a long-term approach, maintaining unity, and avoiding division, and continue to engage in open, inclusive, democratic, transparent, meaningful, and sustainable intergovernmental discussions on all aspects of the AUKUS issue based on equality and mutual respect.

China respects and supports the role of the Secretariat in carrying out its mandate in accordance with the Statute. At the same time, we request that the Secretariat should strictly uphold its technical mandate objectivity, impartiality and independence, fully recognize the sensitivity and complexity of the AUKUS issues, fully respect and seriously treat the different views of Member States and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions particularly the different views and outstanding issues and promote intergovernmental discussions with a scientific and professional attitude.

China stands ready to work with all parties to actively participate in and advance the intergovernmental discussions on various issues related to AUKUS, with a view to contributing to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Thank you, President.