（June 12, 2025, Vienna International Centre）
This is the 18th consecutive time that the Board of Governors and the General Conference of IAEA have reviewed the AUKUS agenda item proposed by China since the announcement of AUKUS. From the perspective of upholding the authority and effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA mechanism, China has consistently advocated for and actively promoted intergovernmental discussions among NPT States Parties and IAEA Member States on all aspects related to AUKUS. Through persistent efforts, IAEA Member States and the international community have gained a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the essence of the AUKUS issue and the significant implications of its safeguards arrangements for the development of the IAEA’s safeguards regime.
On April 24, Permanent Mission of China hosted the third Workshop on AUKUS issue at the VIC. The event brought together representatives from over 30 IAEA Member States—including Permanent Representatives of 17 countries—as well as officials from the IAEA Secretariat, experts and scholars from think tanks and research institutions worldwide. Under the theme “AUKUS: New Challenges to the IAEA Safeguards”, participants engaged in in-depth exchanges and held open, professional, solid, and thorough discussions on various aspects of the safeguards on AUKUS. A summary of the discussions has been circulated as INFCIRC/1293 on the IAEA website. I believe this document of over 30 pages will be helpful for everyone to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the AUKUS issue.
Regarding AUKUS, all IAEA Member States, including the AUKUS partners, emphasized the need to uphold the highest non-proliferation standards and to avoid any negative impact of AUKUS on the NPT regime and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. At the same time, significant differences remain among Member States concerning the AUKUS issue—particularly regarding the nature of AUKUS and the ways to address the precedent it sets for safeguards.
The AUKUS partners continue to package AUKUS into a routine safeguards project. It must be pointed out that this misleads IAEA Member States and deceives the international community. The essence of AUKUS lies in bloc confrontation, it is a military nuclear cooperation between two nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear-weapon military ally for geopolitical strategic purposes, which crosses the threshold of nuclear proliferation and is unprecedented in the history of the NPT. This is the fundamental reason why NPT States Parties attach such importance to the AUKUS issue.
Compared with the hundreds or even thousands of peaceful nuclear cooperation projects conducted by Member States since the establishment of IAEA, AUKUS is entirely different—like the difference between a tiger and a cat. AUKUS safeguards involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and raises numerous complex political, legal, procedural, and technical issues. AUKUS safeguards concern not only the obligations of Australia, as a non-nuclear weapon state, but also the safeguards obligations of the U.S. and the U.K., as nuclear-weapon states, obligations they have never previously undertaken. The difference between AUKUS safeguards and others is like that between an orange and an apple.
If the IAEA were to implement safeguards on AUKUS, it would inevitably break through the boundaries of existing safeguards practices and models, and thus set an important precedent. In particular, it would be the first time ever that Article 14 of CSA would be interpreted as for whether and how this important article would be applicable to AUKUS, and this interpretation will undoubtedly have future implications for other countries. The numerous political, legal, procedural and technical issues involved all require comprehensive and in-depth discussions by all parties. These issues shouldn’t be overly simplified, as there are no simple answers. Since its establishment 68 years ago, IAEA has never implemented safeguards on any nuclear submarine, let alone on safeguards on a nuclear submarine cooperation project between Nuclear-Weapon-States and a Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State. On AUKUS safeguards, IAEA secretariat is not in a position to make a case which is comprehensive, objective, science-based, and convincing all Member States. Also, no single state has the authority to dictate rules to the IAEA and other Member States on these issues.
The IAEA Secretariat is a functional organ that implements the joint decisions made by Member States as well as the safeguards arrangements. For an issue as important and sensitive as AUKUS, caution should be the watchword. China, like other Member States, respects and supports the role of the Secretariat in carrying out its mandate in accordance with the Statute. We also believe that the Secretariat should strictly uphold its technical mandate objectivity, impartiality and independence, fully recognize the sensitivity and complexity of the AUKUS issues, fully respect and seriously treat the different views of Member States and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions - particularly the different views and outstanding issues - in DG’s reports, to work with all Member States to properly address all the issues related to AUKUS .
Throughout the IAEA's history, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards regime has always relied on universal participation, joint efforts and consensual endorsement among Member States. If this tradition is challenged or even undermined by AUKUS, causing divisions among Member States, it could have an immeasurable and profound impact. This is an issue that all Member States, including AUKUS partners, must seriously ponder. AUKUS partners told us that their cooperation would span 2-3 decades. Given such a long time-frame, there’s no need to rush to conclusion. IAEA Member States should strive to seek common grounds while shelving differences, focus on the long term, preserve unity and avoid division, and engage in intergovernmental discussions on all aspects of AUKUS related issues based on equality and mutual respect, so as to jointly safeguard the integrity, effectiveness, authority and universality of NPT and IAEA regimes.