Mr. Chair,

Since the US, the UK and Australia announced their nuclear submarine cooperation, China has proposed for nine consecutive times the inclusion of a stand-alone agenda item within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), titled “Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT”. The IAEA Member States have had in-depth discussion under this item, which fully reflects the widespread concerns of the international community that arose from the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation and proves the necessity for a continued inter-governmental discussion in the IAEA.

During the Board of Governors meeting last June, IAEA Member States had a full discussion on Director General’s report on AUKUS, and on issues concerning the nature of AUKUS, whether article 14 of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) would be applicable, whether the Secretariat had the right to interpret the Article 14 and its applicability unilaterally, whether the precedent created by AUKUS would apply to other Member States and the question of “who is the Agency”, etc., which further deepened the inter-governmental discussion.

 At the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the Eleventh NPT Review Conference in August this year, AUKUS once again became a focus of various parties. The NPT State Parties had more in-depth discussions around AUKUS. China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and Center for Energy and Security Studies jointly organized a side event on “Proliferation risks of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation”. Chinese and Russian experts pointed out at the side event that AUKUS was currently a major challenge faced by the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which would impact the safeguards system of IAEA, and the international community should continue to address the issue through an open, transparent, inclusive and sustainable inter-governmental process. The Permanent Mission of Australia also organized a side event on “naval nuclear propulsion and non-proliferation”. The permanent representatives of the AUKUS partners presented their views on whether NPT prohibits transfer of HEU, on the meaning of “adhering to the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation” as declared by the AUKUS partners, as well as on whether application of Article 14 of the CSA in the case of AUKUS cooperation constitutes “a precedent”.

China welcomes such interactions and discussions. As it has been emphasized on many occasions, China respects the right of other parties to express their views, has no intension to impose ours to any party, and at the same time is opposed to any other country doing so.

Mr. Chair,

At the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the Eleventh NPT Review Conference, China submitted a working paper further presenting China’s position of the issue of AUKUS. Many parts of the working paper are closely related to the work of the Agency, and I would like to take this opportunity to share the following points:

First, The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation not only poses a severe impact upon the security of the world and especially the Asia-Pacific region, but also represents a grave challenge to the international non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system. Such cooperation is unprecedented, since this is the first time for nuclear-weapon States to cooperate with a non-nuclear-weapon State with military alliance on nuclear-powered submarines, which includes the transfer of nuclear naval propulsion reactor and weapon-grade nuclear materials. This act crosses the threshold of nuclear proliferation and constitutes grave proliferation risks. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is a typical act of double standards. It contravenes the object and purpose of the NPT, will open the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation and thus produce profound negative impact upon the political and diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula issue and the Iranian nuclear issue.

Second, Safeguards arrangement on AUKUS cooperation involves complex political, legal and technical issues, and the AUKUS partners and the IAEA have no authority to interpret Article 14 of CSA and its application. There’s a huge international divergence on the application of Article 14, which has never been applied before. The international community is still far from reaching consensus on the definition of “non-peaceful activities” and “non-proscribed military activity” as well as on the scope and procedure for non-application of safeguards. In history, the formation, modification, explanation and execution of all kinds of safeguards agreements are all negotiated and decided by the IAEA Member States, and approved by the Board of Governors. This inclusive and consensus-based approach is crucial to ensuring the development of the IAEA safeguards system. The explanation of Article 14 of CSA is no exception.

Third, The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation concerns the common interests of all IAEA Member States, and involves new practices and new developments in the IAEA safeguards system. Therefore, it should be seriously discussed and fully reviewed by IAEA Member States, instead of being handled privately between the AUKUS partners and the IAEA Secretariat. All IAEA Member States should jointly promote an open, inclusive, transparent and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process with a consensual decision-making approach, so as to resolutely safeguard the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The AUKUS partners shall not start nuclear-powered submarine cooperation before all parties reach consensus. The IAEA Secretariat shall not negotiate and conclude safeguards arrangements with the AUKUS partners arbitrarily

Mr. Chair, colleagues,

We note the Director General’s statement in June on naval nuclear propulsion (2023/Note 44). During this Board meeting, China, together with some Member States that are interested in and concerned about AUKUS, jointly submitted a working paper (INFCIRC/1130), expressing different views on the Director General’s statement and the propositions issued by the AUKUS partners, from various perspectives, inter alia, the interpretation of Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the mandate of the Director General, implications of AUKUS on the IAEA safeguards system, the applicability of Article 14 to AUKUS, as well as ways to advance the intergovernmental discussions, as our contribution to further exchange of views among IAEA Member States in the on-going inter-governmental discussion process on the AUKUS issue. We would like to point out clearly that the approach of the AUKUS partners, namely, reaching safeguards arrangements privately with the Secretariat without the participation of the majority of the Member States, is untenable and has not been recognized by the Member States.

China calls on IAEA Member States to jointly push forward an open, inclusive, transparent and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process, in order to properly handle new practices and new challenges stemming from AUKUS in the field of IAEA safeguards. In this process, we hope that the Director General and the Secretariat will listen carefully to opinions of Member States, focus on building a broader consensus on the AUKUS in accordance with the Agency's Statute and the mandate given by Member States, and create conditions for dialogue among Member States. We also hope that the Secretariat will keep Member States informed of the progress of its consultations with AUKUS partners. The Agency is an intergovernmental international organization composed of and led by Member States. The Secretariat should play its due role in an impartial, transparent and professional manner, based on the consensus reached by Member States.

Finally, we once again urge the US, the UK and Australia to respond to the concerns of the international community with concrete action, faithfully fulfill their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and maintain candid and transparent communication with other Member States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. My team and I stand ready to continue communication and cooperation with AUKUS partners as well as other relevant parties in a responsible and professional manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.