（7 August 2023, Vienna）

Mr. Chair,

The international non-proliferation regime is now facing tremendous challenges. A few nuclear-weapon States, with Cold War mentality and major power competition deeply rooted in their minds and out of their geopolitical consideration, are politicizing and exploiting nuclear non-proliferation by unscrupulously taking double standards and thus exacerbating proliferation risks. The international community should adhere to a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security and take the new round of NPT review process as an opportunity to make efforts to uphold the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime. For this purpose, China would like to raise the following three points:

First, adhering to a common security concept and eliminating the source of nuclear weapons proliferation. Certain major power seeks absolute security for itself at the expense of the security of other states and thus become an important cause of nuclear proliferation. States should abide by a common security concept and strive to improve international and regional security environment. Nuclear-weapon States particularly need to make efforts to stop building military blocs based on geopolitical strategy, following the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, providing legally binding and unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and supporting the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. 

China is gravely concerned that the US and ROK are strengthening “extended deterrence”. The visit of US ballistic missile nuclear submarine to the ROK and the establishment with ROK of a “Nuclear Consultative Group”, which is similar to NATO’s “Nuclear Planning Group”, would heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula, hinder the realization of denuclearization of the Peninsula and stimulate nuclear arms race and proliferation. The US and ROK should halt such acts that are detrimental to international non-proliferation regime and undermine international and regional peace and security. 

Second, adhering to the political and diplomatic settlement of hot-spot regional nuclear issues. The crux of the Korean Peninsula issue lies in the absence of a peace mechanism and the lingering remnants of cold war. The huge trust deficit between the US and the DPRK leads to the continued vicious cycle of “strong to strong” confrontation. China has always been unswervingly striving to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula and persists in addressing the issues with dialogue and consultation. All parties concerned should continue to follow the dual track approach and the principle of phased and synchronized steps to promote the establishment of a peace mechanism and denuclearization of the Peninsula in a balanced manner. The US should take DPRK’s requests seriously and make concrete efforts to address its legitimate concerns. 

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, the JCPOA is an important achievement of multilateralism endorsed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, and a crucial pillar to uphold the international non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East. There is currently no practically feasible alternative to it. The US should abandon its sanctions and pressure on Iran, return to the right path of decoupling the negotiations on resuming the compliance of JCPOA from other issues, promote the early resumption of the negotiations and conclude the deal. Parties concerned should refrain from taking measures that would escalate tension so as to create favourable environment for the resumption of negotiations. China will continue to actively promote the process of a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue while firmly safeguarding our own legitimate rights and interests.

Third, unswervingly upholding and strengthening international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The international nuclear non-proliferation principles and regime need to be upheld and strengthened while the legitimate security interests of non-nuclear weapon States and their right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology should be upheld and guaranteed. These factors are mutually supplementary and reinforcing. The international community should lend support to the IAEA in fulfilling its safeguards-related mandates in an objective, impartial and neutral manner, and continue to promote the universality of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements as well as the Additional Protocol. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887 should be effectively implemented and support should be given to efforts by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in enhancing export control.

Mr. Chair,

The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation not only poses a severe impact upon the security of the world and especially the Asia-Pacific region, but also represents a grave challenge to the international non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system. Such cooperation is unprecedented, since this is the first time for nuclear-weapon States to cooperate with a non-nuclear-weapon State with military alliance on nuclear-powered submarines, which includes the transfer of nuclear naval propulsion reactor and weapon-grade nuclear materials. This act crosses the threshold of nuclear proliferation and constitutes grave proliferation risks. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is a typical act of double standards. It contravenes the object and purpose of the NPT, will open the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation and thus produce profound negative impact upon the political and diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula issue and the Iranian nuclear issue.

 Safeguards arrangement on AUKUS cooperation involves complex political, legal and technical issues, and the AUKUS partners and the IAEA have no authority to interpret Article 14 of CSA and its application. There’s a huge international divergence on the application of Article 14, which has never been applied before. The international community is still far from reaching consensus on the definition of “non-peaceful activities” and “non-proscribed military activity” as well as on the scope and procedure for non-application of safeguards. In history, the formation, modification, explanation and execution of all kinds of safeguards agreements are all negotiated and decided by the IAEA member States, and approved by the Board of Governors. The explanation of Article 14 of CSA is no exception. The AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation concerns the common interests of all IAEA Member States, and involves new practices and new developments in the IAEA safeguards system. Therefore, it should be seriously discussed and fully reviewed by IAEA member States, instead of being handled privately between the AUKUS partners and the IAEA Secretariat. All IAEA Member States should jointly promote an open, inclusive, transparent and sustainable intergovernmental discussion process with a consensual decision-making approach, so as to resolutely safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The AUKUS partners shall not start nuclear-powered submarine cooperation before all parties reach consensus. The IAEA Secretariat shall not negotiate and conclude safeguards arrangements with the three countries arbitrarily.

The Chinese delegation has already submitted a working paper on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, which elaborated on China’s positions. China stands ready to work relentlessly with the international community to uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.