The US, the UK and Australia nuclear submarine cooperation undoubtedly poses a serious nonproliferation challenge to today's international community. It must be addressed not only at the Agency through an intergovernmental review process led by Member States, but also through a solution found through consensus.
Historically, the formulation, revision and interpretation of safeguards agreements has been carried out through extensive participation by the Agency's Member States through a consensus-based approach. Since the establishment of the Agency, safeguards agreements between the Agency and Member States have also been approved by consensus by the Board of Governors, and these are all well documented. They would not have carried the legal weight, legitimacy and broad ownership if they had not been the forged through consensus.
The nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS, given its involvement of illegal transfer of nuclear-weapon materials, is beyond the scope of the existing CSA model text and beyond the scope of CSA between Australia and the Agency. Accordingly, any safeguards arrangements worked out must be subject to consensus decision by Member States through an open intergovernmental consultation process. The Secretariat can only make the corresponding safeguards arrangements with Australia as mandated by Member States and does not have the authority to make decisions on its own. Even in a scenario of a subsidiary arrangement to the existing CSA with Australia, given the proliferative nature of nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS, it will also have to be subject, in the first place, to the discussion and subsequent decision of the Board of Governors on a basis of consensus.
The so-called "legal basis," "legal framework," and "conclusions" put forward by the Director General on his own initiative are nothing more than his personal views and recommendations, no matter how they are labeled. They carry no validity and legality at all unless approved by Member States and endorsed by consensus. Likewise, it is also invalid for the three countries to use the Director General’s report as a clean chit to impose the so-called "safeguards arrangement" without consensus through cynical abuse of their advantage in the number of votes in the Board of Governors.
As far as AUKUS-related nuclear submarine activities pertaining to the Agency, the Agency's budget must be used in accordance with all the relevant provisions in the Statute of the Agency. China is also opposed to using the Agency’s budget for safeguards activities related to the nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS.