Mr. Chairman,

Earlier this week, for the third time in a row, the IAEA Board of Governors decided by consensus to place a separate item on its formal agenda to discuss the "Transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT". This fully reflects the continuing concern of the international community and the wide membership of the Board on this matter.

During the previous two Board sessions, China already stated its solemn positions on AUKUS, requesting the three States to clarify a series of issues, such as whether this cooperation involves nuclear-weapon materials and whether it pertains to the transfer of nuclear-weapon materials from nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. While participating in the discussions in an active and professional manner, most Member States of the Agency have requested the US, UK and Australia to report to Agency Member States in a timely and comprehensive manner on the transfer of nuclear-weapon materials involved in AUKUS in all aspects. The DG also reminded and urged the three Parties to fulfil their non-proliferation legal obligations.

Mr. Chairman,

For some time now, the three countries have been continuing their actions of nuclear submarine cooperation. The US, UK and Australia, following their announcement of the establishment of AUKUS in September 2021, notified the IAEA that the US and the UK would assist Australia in building nuclear submarines. In February this year, leaders of the UK and Australia declared publicly that AUKUS had achieved significant progress. In April, the three Parties once again issued a joint statement and a fact sheet on this issue, announcing that they were further promoting AUKUS cooperation.

At the same time, in accordance with the so-called confidentiality clauses of the "Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement" signed internally, the US, the UK and Australia have not yet made a declaration to the Agency on the AUKUS, especially the related transfer of nuclear weapons materials.

Mr. Chairman,

By and large, the illegality of AUKUS can be summed up in "three acts of violations", as shown clearly in the following two aspects:

1. The three countries, with their trilateral cooperation, violate the NPT

Article I of the NPT stipulates that each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty shall "undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or, control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly", and "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons......". 

Article II stipulates that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty shall "undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly". 

And Article III stipulates that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty shall "undertake to accept safeguards" with the IAEA in accordance with the latter's Statute and safeguards system, and the safeguards required shall be applied on "all source or special fissionable material".

The above articles have explicitly provided for the non-proliferation obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, and they have also made it even more explicit the definition as well as the legal basis for nuclear proliferation. Under such provisions, the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation constitutes a sheer act of nuclear proliferation.

First of all, no matter how the three countries call their trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation, including "naval nuclear propulsion", they cannot evade the basic fact that nuclear weapons materials are transferred from nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state in the above cooperation.

Secondly, no matter how the nuclear weapons materials are disposed of, including by "sealing" the nuclear submarine power reactors, one cannot deny the basic fact that the nuclear weapons materials have been illicitly transferred between the nuclear-weapon states and a non-nuclear-weapon state.

The Article 14 of the Agency's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (non-application clause) is non-applicable to the nuclear weapon materials transferred in the three countries' trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation, given its proliferation nature, in the final analysis. In the meantime, no CSAs shall contradict or even override the NPT as the parent law.

2. Australia violates the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol

First, under the Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Australia, as a NPT non-nuclear-weapon State, shall provide timely and comprehensive information to the Agency on changes in its nuclear material inventory and nuclear facilities. To be more specific, Australia shall provide, at all stages, timely and comprehensive information to the Agency on all aspects of its nuclear submarine cooperation with the US and UK, including the information as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction, prior to the start of construction of its relevant nuclear facilities, the decision to modify its cooperation program, and the receipt of any nuclear materials.

Second, under the Article 2a (i) and Article 18 of its Additional Protocol with the Agency regarding the provision of information on reactor-related sites, Australia shall provide timely relevant  information on its nuclear submarine bases and onshore safeguards facilities.

Third, no bilateral or trilateral arrangement, such as the Agreement for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, shall be used as a pretext to obstruct the implementation of the legal obligations, which the three countries should have otherwise fulfilled as Member States of the Agency under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols.

The US, UK and Australia have hitherto failed to provide the Agency with required information, despite their pronounced decision on their trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation in September 2021. On the other hand, the leaders of the three countries have repeatedly and publicly declared the progress of their trilateral cooperation. The experts of the three countries have held intensive technical meetings to consult on specific aspects of their cooperation; and Australia has even confirmed the construction of a nuclear submarine base on its east coast. This fully shows that the US, UK and Australia have been deliberately dodging their legal obligation in relation to the provision, to the Agency's Secretariat and Member States, of required information on their transfer of nuclear weapon materials, while pushing ahead their trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation since last September 2021. Australia, as a member of the Agency, has thus substantially violated its legal obligations on safeguards, and this must remedied and rectified without delay. The deceiving practice simply does not work.

Mr. Chairman,

It must be pointed out that if the acts of proliferation of the three states are not rectified, the nuclear submarine cooperation of the US, Uk and Australia would produce a series of grave harm and negative impact.

From the perspective of global strategic stability, the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation will intensify geopolitical tensions by drawing ideological lines and creating a new military bloc, to the detriment of global strategic balance and stability.

From the perspective of international security order, the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation, in the same way as QUAD, is designed to subordinate to and serve the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, aiming to provoke confrontation between camps through geo-zero-sum games, to the detriment of the international security order.

From the perspective of regional peace and stability, the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation will pose a real threat to regional countries by aggravating regional tension, and stimulate the regional countries' military build-up, with a new round of arms race. And all these will drastically increase the risk of military conflicts.

From the perspective of the global non-proliferation regime, the nuclear transfer involved in the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation is, for the first time since the NPT's conclusion, an open transfer of tons of nuclear weapons materials between nuclear-weapon-states and a non-nuclear-weapon state. This move will jeopardize the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Treaty of Rarotonga, as well as the ASEAN countries' efforts to establish the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. By allowing Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon country, to receive prohibited nuclear-weapon materials, the US has adopted a double standard and imposed unilateral sanctions on some other non-nuclear-weapon states for developing uranium enrichment technology and acquiring nuclear materials for civilian uses. The may prompt other countries to follow suit, or even venture to go beyond the nuclear threshold.

Mr. Chairman,

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his recent global security initiative, calls on all countries to embrace a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, abandon cold-war mentality, oppose unilateralism and refrain from bloc politics and confrontation. the initiative has been well received by the international community. Yet some countries insist on centrism and exceptionalism, cling to their cold-war mentality, follow the logic of hegemony and push ahead with bloc politics. Doing so goes against the tide of history and can only lead to conflict and confrontation and divide the international community. 

The US, the UK and Australia's trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation is a matter bearing on global strategic stability, international security order, regional peace and stability and global non-proliferation system, with profound and far-reaching negative implications. This natural demands political response by the relevant international and regional security mechanisms. At the same time, the IAEA shall also give its respond in a manner consistent with its mandate. China proposes that the IAEA focus its work on the following areas:

First, to continue the intergovernmental discussion process, especially by making it a standing item on the agenda or establishing a special committee, for Member States of the Agency to jointly work out an agreed formula on the issue of US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation, and, on this basis, submit relevant recommendation report to the Board and the General Conference of the Agency.

Secondly, Australia must earnestly fulfill its legal obligations on safeguards and provide, at all stages, timely and comprehensive information to the Agency's Secretariat on the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation in accordance with the relevant provision of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Third, the Director General of the Agency must duly report, in a comprehensive manner, to the Board on status of the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation in accordance with Article 12 of the Agency's Statute and take remedial measures for three countries' violation duly rectified without delay.

Fourth, pending an agreed formula worked out through the ongoing inter-governmental process, the US, the UK and Australia shall not proceed further in their trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation. And nor shall the Agency's secretariat, in the absence of the agreed mandate of the Board, proceed to negotiate, on its own, any safeguards arrangement with the three countries on the latter's trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation.

Mr. Chairman,

China calls on all Member States of the Agency to work and channel their efforts towards an agreed formula, through the ongoing intergovernmental discussion, on the issue of the three countries' nuclear submarine cooperation, by focusing on its very essence and ascertaining the facts, so as to joint defend the NPT, safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and preserve international peace and security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.