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Why Are There Two Parallel Items on the Agenda of the IAEA Board of Governors on AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Cooperation?
2022-10-07 00:07

On the face of it the existence of two parallel agenda items on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is an anomaly. A brief enquiry into the reasons for this may be instructive.

Soon after the pronounced decision, in September 2021, by the US, UK and Australia on their nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted by consensus a standalone agenda item on the question “Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT”. This agenda item was proposed by China. Since then, this agenda item has been placed before the Board of Governors no less than four times, on every occasion by consensus.

At this Board meeting, however, there were two items on the same issue on the agenda. One, as mentioned just now, was proposed by China and successively adopted by consensus. The other, on agency safeguards in the context of naval propulsion under AUKUS, has appeared now and has been proposed by the three countries on short notice and pushed through without consensus.

One can only assume that by trying to persuade the Director General to propose a parallel agenda item based on their instructions and wording to replace the item suggested by China and adopted multiple times by the Board of Governors, every time by consensus, an attempt was being made to muddy the waters and sow confusion in the minds of the Member States.

In any case, it is palpably wrong, and extremely confusing, to have two agenda items, though with a slightly different wording, that essentially deal with the same subject. That subject being an enquiry into the safeguards aspects under NPT of the transfer of nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS.

Many Member States believe that the manner in which these two items are handled will become the litmus test of the nuclear non-proliferation functions of the IAEA. These Member States point out that the fundamental difference between the two items lies not in wording but in the transfer of nuclear material involved in the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation.

These Member States stress two aspects of this issue. First, on the one hand, they point out that the proposed submarine nuclear cooperation involves the “original sin” of transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material from NWS to an NNWS. This is an outright act of nuclear proliferation and is in strict violation of Articles I and II of the NPT.

On the other hand, these `Member States mention that even in terms of procedure, one cannot talk about safeguards without first discussing the prerequisite question of whether nuclear material is involved and if so, what nuclear material is involved? To do so would be tantamount to putting the cart before the horse.

It is important to note the reasons for which the three countries have so far failed to sow dissent and confusion. They failed for the following reasons.

Firstly, there is no item of the Director General because he was unwilling to publicly succumb to their political maneuvering and wanted to save face.

Secondly, and much more significantly, the item proposed by China could not be taken off the agenda because it was objective, impartial, compliant with all relevant rules and regulations, focused on agency functions, closely linked to the NPT as the fundamental law, open and above board, and a full display of China’s constructive attitude. That is why it was widely endorsed and supported, time and again, consistently and with consensus, by Agency Members.

Under these circumstances, the three countries had no choice but to propose a parallel item on the same issue. Doing so confirms their guilty conscience about their illegal nuclear proliferation behavior. It is, however, ironical, but the harder they tried to conceal the true nature of their act of proliferation, the more attention it attracted.

Thirdly, the item proposed by the US, on behalf of the three countries, was entitled “Agency safeguards in the context of naval propulsion under AUKUS”. A couple of things are noteworthy here. One is that the item from the three countries was intended to get endorsement from agency safeguards for their nuclear submarine cooperation without any reference to the NPT; the other is to evade, under the pretext of naval nuclear propulsion, the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material involved in the trilateral cooperation and nuclear proliferation issues arising therefrom.

The goal of the US proposed item is to conceal the true nature of illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material involved in the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation and through political maneuvering coerce the Secretariat into proposing a safeguards approach, which legitimizes this illegal trilateral cooperation and push it through the Board by cynically relying on their voting advantage, thereby making the Agency endorse their illegal proliferation practices. Should their attempt succeed, the Agency would be reduced to a tool for nuclear proliferation and become a "nuclear proliferation agency" in every sense of the phrase. Such an unfortunate development would have the effect of bringing down with it the international nuclear non-proliferation system.

Fourthly, it is worthwhile to recall an episode that took place at the first meeting. When the agenda was considered at the first that meeting, the US proposed item lacked supporting document such as an Explanatory Memorandum required by the Rules of Procedure. The Chinese delegation, rather than directly seeking the deletion of the above item, opted instead for a constructive motion, calling for a 15-minute suspension, giving the US delegation an opportunity to rectify their omissions and propose their item again with supplementary material. On that basis, China stated again its position on of not joining the consensus on their item. China’s actions throughout the Board meeting were constructive and open and above board, which was praised by many Member States.

Fifthly, and currently, China would like suggest that various parties should, can and have reason to focus on common ground, and most particularly between China and the three countries in particular. of AUKUS. China hopes to have an intergovernmental discussion process with the United States of America in the Board of Governors. The US should not do whatever they want by relying on their voting advantage in the Board. China calls on the US to abandon its confrontational behavior, stop political maneuvering vis a vis the Secretariat and join other Agency Members in the search for a solution to the issue of the trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation. 


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