The NPT is the fundamental law underpinning the international nuclear non-proliferation system, on which the IAEA safeguards system is based. As the inter-governmental discussion process in the IAEA Board of Governors deepens, the international community is highly concerned as to whether Australia, a NNWS, has violated its legal reporting obligations under its CSA and AP with the Agency. The international community is also concerned that United Kingdom and the United States of America, two NWS, have violated Article II of the NPT and jeopardized the non-proliferation regime by transferring weapons grade nuclear material to Australia.

On this topic, the Spokesperson of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna gave the following views:

The three countries, especially Australia, have failed their legal reporting obligations under their CSA and relevant protocols. Under its CSA modified Code 3.1, Australia, as an NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State, shall submit timely and comprehensive reports, at all phases, to the Agency, its nuclear submarine cooperation, the commencement of construction of facilities, modification of the cooperation programmes, and the receipt of nuclear materials. And under Articles 2a(i) and Article 18 of its AP, Australia shall also submit timely reports to the Agency on its nuclear submarine bases and onshore security facilities.

However, since formally announcing their decision on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, the three countries have hitherto failed, contrary to the relevant provisions of the NPT and wishes of the international community, to provide any substantive information on this cooperation. In fact, they have defiantly moved forward with the illegal activities under AUKUS.

This arrogant behavior  clearly shows that the three countries have since the beginning been withholding information from the Agency secretariat and member states on the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material.

The trilateral nuclear submarine cooperation has never been an issue of safeguards arrangement, but rather a legitimacy issue of whether relevant cooperation involves the illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material. This is the core and crux of the whole issue.

The fact is that the trilateral cooperation does involve the illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material and  therefore irrespective of the legality of the matter, the Agency safeguards automatically become applicable and have to be complied with. This is the law as it stands at present.

The real purpose of the three countries is to mislead the Agency by changing concepts and thereby to whitewash the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material from NWSs to a NNWS which is strictly forbidden.

If we permit this now, then any NNWS can follow this precedent to acquire nuclear-weapon material and technology under the pretext of nuclear submarine cooperation. In such an event, the international nuclear non-proliferation system will exist only in name and make a mockery of the safeguards that the international community has worked so hard to put in place for making the planet a place of safety and stability.

We might as well end by making other illegal activities acceptable such as money laundering by banks.

China underlines once again that the three countries must, in compliance with their legal safeguards obligations and as required by CSA and AP, provide timely and comprehensive information on the various phases of their nuclear submarine cooperation. Otherwise, the ability of the Agency secretariat and the Director-General to discharge their obligations under the Statute will inevitably be affected.