In September 2021, Australia, United Kingdom and the United States of America launched a program of “nuclear submarine co-operation” under the rubric of AUKUS.
The potential risks posed by this tripartite cooperation to the non-proliferation regime and to global peace and stability raised grave concerns amongst members of the international community.
Consequently, China proposed an open, transparent inter-governmental discussion of this issue to assuage global concerns and to find a consensual, acceptable solution to avoid the risks inherent in the unsanctioned tripartite nuclear submarine nuclear cooperation.
At China's behest a standalone agenda item entitled “Transfer of nuclear material in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT” was approved for such a discussion by the IAEA Board of Governors at its November 2021 session and consecutive four sessions since, every time by consensus.
This notwithstanding, the three countries have avoided any meaningful discussion of this very grave issue which, as stated, is a matter of universal concern. They have instead tried to camouflage the issue by spuriously describing it as an innocuous, harmless “naval nuclear propulsion”.
In this regard and to fully explain that this tripartite nuclear submarine co-operation is a sheer act of nuclear proliferation contrary to the NPT and thus a global risk, the Spokesperson of the Chinese Mission to the United Nations in Vienna had the following opinion to offer:
On the issue of AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation, the three countries have done their utmost to conceal the true nature of this cooperation and to mislead public opinion by claiming nuclear material sealed in reactors cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons. This is incorrect because the nuclear submarine co-operation envisaged under AUKUS clearly involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade nuclear material without safeguards from two NWSs to a NNWS. This subterfuge just confirms that the three countries are deliberately concealing information on, and the true nature of, the transfer of nuclear-weapon materials under AUKUS.
It is impossible to deny the fundamental conclusion that the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation is a disguised form of illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material for which no safeguards have been foreseen or put in place.
The hard fact is that AUKUS not only conceals the true nature of the illegal transfer of nuclear-weapon material involved in the trilateral cooperation, but much more sinisterly it also lowers the nuclear safety, security of that material which undoubtedly heightens the proliferation risk thereby weakening the NPT regime and posing a direct threat to global peace and stability.
If the three countries really believe what they say, then why did they impose, under the pretext of avoiding nuclear proliferation, unilateral sanctions on NNWS for developing and acquiring civilian nuclear material?
Article I of the NPT clearly sets out the obligations of NWSs. As NWSs who blatantly and directly are transferring tons and tons of weapons-grade nuclear material to Australia which is a NNWS, the US and UK are clearly in breach of Article I of the NPT. This assertion also begs the question whether Australia as a NNWS can receive weapons-grade nuclear material from US and UK, two NWSs, without coming in conflict with Article II of the NPT?
Faced with these and other serious concerns of the international community about the proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material, the three countries, instead of answering the substantive questions concerning their cooperation under AUKUS, have from the beginning tried to cover up the illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material by referring to it as "naval nuclear propulsion". This attempt to mislead public opinion cannot succeed as it is increasingly seen as a trick to create confusion and muddy the waters.
China urges the three countries to rectify their mistake immediately and change course in time rather than go down the path of nuclear proliferation, wreck the global nuclear non-proliferation system and put themselves on the opposite side of the international community and all IAEA member states.